Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1957

Paul Sugar and Harry Ulmer dba Sugar & Ulmer v.
Harry B. Miller : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Ralph & Bushnell; Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Sugar v. Miller, No. 8639 (Utah Supreme Court, 1957).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2785

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

NOV 1 1957
LAW L~~:lAR'i

Case No. 8639

In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
PAUL SUGAR and HARRY ULMER,
d/b/a S.UGAR & ULMER, a copart-

nership,

!fJ

' 'rr - .

~

1210rl7
...JJ

Appellants,. ____________________________ _
Cl~rk, Supre-~~--c;·;~-;,.~---iit;h···--.

- vs.HARRY B. MILLER,

Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

RALPH & BUSHNELL

Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

T A!BLE

0'F CO·NTENTS

Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS ·-·-·········--··························-·········---·-····

1

STATEME~~T

OF POINTS..........................................................

2

ARGUMENT .............................. _············-·······-----------------....... _______

3

POINT O·NE:
DEFENDENT STIPULATED THAT HE REC'EIVED THE $2,000 AS ALLE·GE·D IN THE COMPLAINT. HE DID NOT STIPULATE AS TO INTEREST A.ND ATTORNEYS' FEES --------------------------------

3

POINT TWO·:
THE COURT'S FINDINGS O·F FACT ARE A·MPLY
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, AND T'HE CO,URT'S
CONCLUSIO·NS O·F LAW NECESSARI~LY AND·
CORRECTLY CORRESPO·ND WITH THE FINDA
INGS OF FACT --------------------------------------------------------------------

4

POINT THREE:
THE CO·URT'S FINDINGS OF FACT THAT T'HE
PLAINTIFFS AGREED TO PAY THE DEFENDAN'T IS NOT ·BARRED BY THE ST'ATUTE OF
FRAUDS ......... _____ . ___________________ ---------------.... --------.--------------------

5

CON CL USI 0 N __ .---------·------ ·------------------------------------------------------------

8

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
35
35
35
35
35

A.L.R.
A.L.R.
A L.R.
.A.L.R.
A.L.R.

2d
2d
2d
2d
·2d

906. ____ .. __ ._____ .... -------.----------------------------------------------...
908.... -----------------------------------------------------------------------909.... ------------····-------------------------------------------------------910... ------------------------------------------------------------------------912..... -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
6
6
6
9

IN·DEX OF AUTHORITIES (Continued)

Page
35 A.L.R. 2d 913........................................................ ----·--------------- 9
35 A.L.R. 2d 936....·-··············-----·······-·---·--···-·····--------------------------- 7
41 A.L.R. 2d 677............................ --------·-------------·-·------············----- 4
49 Am. Jur. 417, 4118........... ········-----------------------------------------------·-

8

37 C.J.S. 523, 530, 531.................................................................. 8
Davis v. Patrick, 141 U.S. 479, '35 L. Ed 826, 12 S. Ct. 58........ 8

Eilertsen v. Weber, et al, Oregon 1953, 2·55 P. 2d 150............ 8
Fairview Lumber Co. v. Makos, Washington, 1954, 265
p. 2d ~837 .. ······-·· ........................ -·.-·····------------···-·--··· ·····------------ 8
Guto\vsky v. Halliburton Oil Well Co., Okla. 1955, 287 P.
2d '204..... -.. -·--....................... ··-··--..... --.----------------------------. ·------.. 8

Moon v. ·Greenlee, et al., Colo., 1920, I95 P. II()()________________ 8
Parrish v. Greco, ·California, I953, 258 P. 2d 566____________________ 8
Suverkrup et al v. Suhl, California, I95I, 238 P. 2d 674________ 8
Statute of Frauds, Title 25-5-4, U.C.A. I953......... --------------- 5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
PAUL SUGAR and HARRY ULMER,
d/b/a SUGAR & UiLMER, a copartnership,
Appellants,

Case

- vs.-

No. 8'639

HARRY B. MILLER,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Throughout this brief ·the parties will be referred to as
they appear in the action below. D·efendant (Respondent) disagrees with the statement of facts as appears in the Plaintiffs=(Appellants') brief.
The: defendant is the owner and operator of the Lorraine
Press, a printing establishment, and the plaintiffs are the
general partners of an accounting firm. At ~the latter part
of the Utah "uranium boom," around 1955, the plaintiffs organized a company called the Deseret Uranium Company
(R. 10) and contacted the defendant to obtain his services to
print the prospectus for the company. Having had bad experience with uranium· companies, the defendant refused to
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extend credit to the company and accepted ·the printing order
only after the plaintiffs had personally assumed the payment.
(R. 14, 15, 16, 18). The bill for tthe printing came to $2,468.80
(Exhibit No. 3).
In January, 1956, after repeated demands for payment,
the plaintiffs and the defendant obtained a loan from a bank
for $2,000, and the plaintiff signed with the ,defendant as comakers. (R. 3) The money from the loan was given to the
defendant as partial payment of the bill with the understanding that the plaintiffs would be reimbursed from the uranium
company underwriting proceeds (R. 28).
The plaintiffs brought rthis action to recover the $2,000
which they had paid back to the bank. They alleged that
they had only guaranteed the note. Defendant counter-claimed
and alleged as a set-of£ that the plaintiffs owed him the
$2,468.80 for the printing, and that therefore the defendant
was entitled to a judgment of $468.80 on the counter-claim.
At the trial the defendant ~stipulated as to the amount
claim·ed on the note, and it was agreed that the only issue
in the case concerned the set-off (R. 8, 9). It is upon the mal
court's findings fur the defendant that this appeal is taken.
STATE:MENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT O·NE: DEFENDANT STIPULATED THAT HE
RECEIVED THE $2,000 AS ALLEGED IN THE COM·
PLAINT. HE DID NOT STI·PULATE AS TO INTEREST
AND ATTORNEYS' FEES.
POINT fWO: THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT
ARE AMPLY SUPPO·RTED BY EVIDENCE, AND THE
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COURTS c:o·NCLUSlONS OF LA:W NEC.ESSARILY
AND CO·RRE·CTLY CORRESPOND WITH THE FINDINGS OF FACT.
POINT THREE: THE COURT'S FINDINGS O:F FACf
TIIAT THE PLAIN'TIF·FS AGREE.D TO PAY THE DEFENDANT IS NOT BARRE.D B·Y THE STATUTE O·F
FRAU~os.

ARGUMENT
POINT O·NE.
DEFEN·DANT STIPULATED THAT HE RE~CEIVED·
THE ·$2,000 AS ALLEGE·D IN THE CO~MPLAINT. HE
DID NOT STIPULATE. AS TO INTEREST AND ATTORNE.YS~ FEES.
The only issue involVred in this case is whether or not
the ~defendant has a set-off against tthe plaintiffs. The amount of
money involved in both the complaint and the counter-claim
was not in question, and at the beginning of the trial, counsel
for the defendant stipulated ~that $·2,000 was received by the
defendant (R. 8, H) and ·at the same time pointed out that the
amount claimed to be owed by the plainrtiffs was not in question (R. 8). Plaintiffs have never questioned the correctness
of this amount as shown on EXhibit No. 3.
To expedite the trial, the defendant stipulated to 'the
amount in controversy ·as claimed in the complaint (R. 9). 'That
he did not intend to stipulate as .to inJterest and attorneys~ fees
is apparent. In his answer the defendant denied ~that the plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys~ fees (R. 4); in fact, t~he note in
question was not such as to allow sudh £el,"{'1f it was not
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between the defendant and the plaintiffs since they were comakers, and (2) there was no contractual relationship between
them awa~ding attorneys' .fees (R. 3). In addition, the ·defendant
had counter-claimed for $468.80, whereas if he had stipulated
to the entire amount claimed in the complainrt, it would have
exceeded the amount of the counterclaim, and there would
have been nothing to litigate.

See 41 A.L.R. 2d 677 and
cas·es cited therein where the majority rule is stated that

where an offset exceeds the amount owed, no attorneys;, fees
will be awarded.
The court cor1:ectly found no cause of action on the complaint. Since the amount of the plaintiffs' ·claim was stipulated
to be $2,000.00 and the court found that the plaintiffs owed
the defendant ·$2,468.80 (R. 61), the court was oorreot in its
ruling.

This matter was specifically argued after the trial

and before the signing of the findings of fact and conclusions
by the court.

A·fter careful review of the plaintiffs' position,

the court ruled in favor of the defendant.

POINT TWO
THE COURT'S FINDIN'GS OF FACT ARE AMPLY
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, AND THE COURT'S
CO·N·CLUSIONS OF LAW NECESSARILY AND CORRECTLY CO·RRESPOND WITH THE FINDINGS OF
FACT.
The plaintiff·s criticize the form of the court's findings.
Whether or not the plaintiffs agreed to pay the defendant
is a finding of fact which the court arrived at after hearing
the evidence. Based upon this finding, the court concluded in
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its Conclusions of L~aw that 1the defendant was entitled to a
judgment. As long as the evidence ·supports the findings,
which outside of the evidentiary objection the plaintiffs do
not question, the court was correct in basing its conclusions
upon such findings.

POINT THREE
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT THAT THE
PLAINTIFFS AGREED TO PAY THE DEFEND·ANT
IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
Plaintiffs allege that thE- statements made by the plaintiffs
constituting on agreement are barred by rthe following section
of the Statute of Frauds. Title 25-5-4, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended:
"'In the following cases every agreement shall be void
unless ·such agreement or some note or memorandum
thereof is in writing subscribed by the party to be
charged therewith:
.
"(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or
miscarriage of another."
The problem of whether a promise by a stockholder, officer, or director to pay a debt of a corporation is subject to
the starute of Frauds is well annotated in 35 A.L.R. 2d 906.
From this annotation the following general rules are taken:
The problem usually resolves itself into a determination
of whether the promise was original or collateral. The important question is how can a particular promise be determined
to be either original or collateral. There are various tests
which different courts use, although there is no universal
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test used by all coum:s is all ·circumstances. (Ibid. P. 908). The
following tests are then enumerated:
1. . "If the main purpose and object in making the
promise is not to answer for another, but to suhserve
the promisor's interest, and the consideration is beneficial to him, the promise is. original and not within
the statute." (Ibid. P. 909).

In this case the plaintiffs stated that they had a material
interest in the uranium company (R. 11). They picked the
officers (R. 11, 12). The plaintiffs stated that rthey were to receive a cash payment from the company if the public offering
was a ·success (R. 11), and the printing of a prospectus is, of
course, necessary for a pubhc offering. Inasmuch as the plaintiffs were to receive substantial compensation in the form of
cash, royalties, and stock f.or their services, they stood to benefit
beyond the usual benefits that enure to a ~stockholder. Aside
from this, 'Where the promisor owns a majority of the stock,
the courts s·eem ·more inclined to find that rthe benefits to
him is sufficient to take the promise out of the statute" (Ibid.
P. 910).
2. "The determination of whether such a promise is
original or collateral depends upon whether such a
promise is original ·to the promisor, or whether the
indebtedness is also primarily that of the third person.
In the latter case i1t is within the statute, while in the
former it may not be." (Ibid. P. 909).
The defendant did not intend to extend any credit to the
uranium company. He had had unfavorable experience in
relying on such companies for payment, and in fact he would
not take the order for the printing unless the plaintiff.s assumed
the obligation (R. 14-16). The defendant emphatically informed
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the plaintiffs that he could not speculate on a uranium company
(R. 19). The defendant 'had printed :85 .to 90 per cent of the
prospectuses :f.or such companies (R. 20) and knew that he
could nat rely on their ability to s·eM stock. The company,
in fact, was never able ~to sell its stock. In this case the credit
was extended solely to the plaintif:f.s which the obligation
primary theirs and thus outsi·de the Statute of Frauds.
Appellants allege that the fact that goods are charged on
the books of a merchant to the pe~son for whose use they were
furnished is prima facie evidence, aJt least that they were sold
on his credit. A search of the cases reveals that the law is not
that certain. Quoting from 35 A.L.R. 2d at P. 936 wherein
this precise subJect is annotated:
"Such charge (on the merchant's books) is evidence, no
doubt, of an intent on the part of the crediltor to look
to the corporation :For payment, and the language used
in some of the opinions would indicate that such a
·charge is regarded as conclusive against the crediror.
It is fair to assume, however, that the court had in mind
the facts o£ the partioular case, and was merely referring to the effeot of the charge to the corporation as an
evidentiary fact in view of the circumstances, without
any intention of asserting a rule of law.n
The trial court considered this evidence wit!h all o£ the other
evidence in the case and found in favor of thedefendant.
There is substantial competent evidence to support the
following facts:

1.

The plainltiffslJ promise was original and not collateral.

2.

The obj-ect of the plaintiffs' promise was to subserve
or promote a personal interest of their own.
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3.

The benefit the plaintiffs were to derive was more
than the indirect benefit which would accrue Ito them
as stockholders in the uranium ··company.

4.

The credit was given to the plaintiffs and not to. the
corporation.

5.

Plaintiffs~

promise was made to induce the defendant
to print the prospectuses after he had refused to perform on behalf of the corporation only.

Any one or all of these mentioned facts regarding this case
are sufficient to rtake the plaintiffs' promise out of the Statute
of Frauds.
The following additional citations are given to support the
above propositions: 49 Am. ]ur. pp. 417, 418; 37 C.].S. pp. 523,
530, 531; Moon v. Greenlee, et al., Colorado, 1920; 195 p. 1100
Parish v. Greco, California_, 1953, 258 P. 2d 566; Suverkrup et al.
v. Suhl, California, 1951, 238 P. 2d 674; Eilertsen v. Weber, et
al., Oregon, 1953, 255 P. 2d 150; Gutowsky v. Halliburton Oil
Well Co., Oklahoma, 1955, 287 P. 2d 204; Fairview Lumber Co.
v. Makos, Washington, 1954, 265 P. 2d 837.
CONCLUSION
In the United States Supreme Comt case of Davis v.
Patrick, 141 U.S. 479, 35 L. Ed. 826, 12 S. Ct. 58, the purpose
of thi~ provisions of the Statute of Frauds was discussed. Its
purposes, as· there set f.o1~th, were to place the duty of paying a
debt on the person receiving the benefit since there is a tendancy
of a pflon1isee, when the real debtor is unable to pay, to enlarge
the dEbt or the responsibilH): by torturing mere words of encouragcn1ent and confidence into an absolute promise. The court
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said, " . . . it is so obviously just that a promisor receiving no
benefits should be bound only by the exact terms of his promise,
that this statute requiring a. memorandum in writing was enacted.'' The court went on to say, "But cases sometimes arise
in whidh, though a third party is the original obligor, the prim·ary debtor, the promisor has a personal, immediate and pecuniary interest in the transaction, and is .therefore himself a
party to be benefited by the performance of the promisee. In
such cases the r-eason which underlies and which prompted this
statutory provision fails, and the courts will give effect to the
promise." See also 35 A.L.R. 2d. 912, 913, wherein rth.is case is
cited.
The trial of this case invo1ved one issue, namely, did the
plaintiffs personally agree to pay the bill; or, stated differently,
was the printing done for them individually. Tiris raised primarilv a factual issue and the court found that issue in favor
of the defendant. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the defendant, it is manifest there is sufficient competent evidence not only to sustain the finding of the trial court, but
rather it compels such a determination. The agreement in question and the circumstances therewith fall ~squarely within the
policy that is outside the purpos·es of the Statute of Frauds.
There£ore, ·evidence as to the agreement was correctly admitted, and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.
RespectfuBy submitted,

RALPH & B-USHNE·LL,
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respond'elllt
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